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Abstract
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions
of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a
third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens,
focusing on what is perhaps the most basic and fundamental model in this space: the celebrated Bayesian
persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [34]. Here there are two players, a sender and a receiver.
The receiver must take one of a number of actions with a-priori unknown payoff, and the sender has
access to additional information regarding the payoffs of the various actions for both players. The sender
can commit to revealing a noisy signal regarding the realization of the payoffs of various actions, and
would like to do so as to maximize her own payoff in expectation assuming that the receiver rationally
acts to maximize his own payoff. When the payoffs of various actions follow a joint distribution (the
common prior), the sender’s problem is nontrivial, and its computational complexity depends on the
representation of this prior.
We examine the sender’s optimization task in three of the most natural input models for this problem,
and essentially pin down its computational complexity in each. When the payoff distributions of the
different actions are i.i.d. and given explicitly, we exhibit a polynomial-time (exact) algorithmic solution,
and a “simple” (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm. Our optimal scheme for the i.i.d. setting involves an
analogy to auction theory, and makes use of Border’s characterization of the space of reduced-forms for
single-item auctions. When action payoffs are independent but non-identical with marginal distributions
given explicitly, we show that it is #P-hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility. In doing so,
we rule out a generalized Border’s theorem, as defined by Gopalan et al [30], for this setting. Finally,
we consider a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution of action payoffs presented by a black box
sampling oracle, and exhibit a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with a bi-criteria
guarantee. Our FPTAS is based on Monte-Carlo sampling, and its analysis relies on the principle of
deferred decisions. Moreover, we show that this result is the best possible in the black-box model for
information-theoretic reasons.
∗Supported in part by NSF CAREER Award CCF-1350900.
†Supported by NSF grant CCF-1350900.
1 Introduction
“One quarter of the GDP is persuasion.”
This is both the title, and the thesis, of a 1995 paper by McCloskey and Klamer [39]. Since then,
persuasion as a share of economic activity appears to be growing — a more recent estimate places the figure
at 30% [4]. As both papers make clear, persuasion is intrinsic in most human endeavors. When the tools of
“persuasion” are tangible — say goods, services, or money — this is the domain of traditional mechanism
design, which steers the actions of one or many self-interested agents towards a designer’s objective. What
[39, 4] and much of the relevant literature refer to as persuasion, however, are scenarios in which the power
to persuade derives from an informational advantage of some party over others. This is also the sense
in which we use the term. Such scenarios are increasingly common in the information economy, and it is
therefore unsurprising that persuasion has been the subject of a large body of work in recent years, motivated
by domains as varied as auctions [9, 25, 24, 10], advertising [3, 33, 17], voting [2], security [46, 42], multi-
armed bandits [37, 38], medical research [35], and financial regulation [28, 29]. (For an empirical survey
of persuasion, we refer the reader to [21]). What is surprising, however, is the lack of systematic study of
persuasion through a computational lens; this is what we embark on in this paper.
In the large body of literature devoted to persuasion, perhaps no model is more basic and fundamental
than the Bayesian Persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [34], generalizing an earlier model by
Brocas and Carrillo [14]. Here there are two players, who we call the sender and the receiver. The receiver
is faced with selecting one of a number of actions, each of which is associated with an a-priori unknown
payoff to both players. The state of nature, describing the payoff to the sender and receiver from each action,
is drawn from a prior distribution known to both players. However, the sender possesses an informational
advantage, namely access to the realized state of nature prior to the receiver choosing his action. In order to
persuade the receiver to take a more favorable action for her, the sender can commit to a policy, often known
as an information structure or signaling scheme, of releasing information about the realized state of nature to
the receiver before the receiver makes his choice. This policy may be simple, say by always announcing the
payoffs of the various actions or always saying nothing, or it may be intricate, involving partial information
and added noise. Crucially, the receiver is aware of the sender’s committed policy, and moreover is rational
and Bayesian. We examine the sender’s algorithmic problem of implementing the optimal signaling scheme
in this paper. A solution to this problem, i.e., a signaling scheme, is an algorithm which takes as input the
description of a state of nature and outputs a signal, potentially utilizing some internal randomness.
1.1 Two Examples
To illustrate the intricacy of Bayesian Persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow [34] use a simple example in
which the sender is a prosecutor, the receiver is a judge, and the state of nature is the guilt or innocence
of a defendant. The receiver (judge) has two actions, conviction and acquittal, and wishes to maximize
the probability of rendering the correct verdict. On the other hand, the sender (prosecutor) is interested
in maximizing the probability of conviction. As they show, it is easy to construct examples in which the
optimal signaling scheme for the sender releases noisy partial information regarding the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. For example, if the defendant is guilty with probability 13 , the prosecutor’s best strategy
is to claim “guilt” whenever the defendant is guilty, and also claim “guilt” just under half the time when
the defendant is innocent. As a result, the defendant will be convicted whenever the prosecutor claims
“guilt” (happening with probability just under 23 ), assuming that the judge is fully aware of the prosecutor’s
signaling scheme. We note that it is not in the prosecutor’s interest to always claim “guilt”, since a rational
judge aware of such a policy would ascribe no meaning to such a signal, and render his verdict based solely
on his prior belief — in this case, this would always lead to acquittal.1
1In other words, a signal is an abstract object with no intrinsic meaning, and is only imbued with meaning by virtue of how it is
used. In particular, a signal has no meaning beyond the posterior distribution on states of nature it induces.
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A somewhat less artificial example of persuasion is in the context of providing financial advice. Here,
the receiver is an investor, actions correspond to stocks, and the sender is a stockbroker or financial adviser
with access to stock return projections which are a-priori unknown to the investor. When the adviser’s
commission or return is not aligned with the investor’s returns, this is a nontrivial Bayesian persuasion
problem. In fact, interesting examples exist when stock returns are independent from each other, or even
i.i.d. Consider the following simple example which fits into the i.i.d. model considered in Section 3: there
are two stocks, each of which is a-priori equally likely to generate low (L), moderate (M), or high (H)
short-term returns to the investor (independently). We refer to L/M/H as the types of a stock, and associate
them with short-term returns of 0, 1 + ǫ, and 2 respectively. Suppose, also, that stocks of type L or H are
associated with poor long-term returns of 0; in the case of H, high short-term returns might be an indication
of volatility or overvaluation, and hence poor long-term performance. This leaves stocks of type M as the
only solid performers with long-term returns of 1. Now suppose that the investor is myopically interested in
maximizing short-term returns, whereas the forward-looking financial adviser is concerned with maximizing
long-term returns, perhaps due to reputational considerations. Simple calculation shows that providing full
information to the myopic investor results in an expected long-term reward of 13 , as does providing no
information. An optimal signaling scheme, which guarantees that the investor chooses a stock with type
M whenever such a stock exists, is the following: when exactly one of the stocks has type M recommend
that stock, and otherwise recommend a stock uniformly at random. A simple calculation using Bayes’ rule
shows that the investor prefers to follow the recommendations of this partially-informative scheme, and it
follows that the expected long-term return is 59 .
1.2 Results and Techniques
Motivated by these intricacies, we study the computational complexity of optimal and near-optimal persua-
sion in the presence of multiple actions. We first observe that a linear program with a variable for each
(state-of-nature, action) pair computes a description of the optimal signaling scheme. However, when ac-
tion payoffs are distributed according to a joint distribution — say exhibiting some degree of independence
across different actions — the number of states of nature may be exponential in the number of actions; in
such settings, both the number of variables and constraints of this linear program are exponential in the
number of actions. It is therefore unsurprising that the computational complexity of persuasion depends
on how the prior distribution on states of nature is presented as input. We therefore consider three natural
input models in increasing order of generality, and mostly pin down the complexity of optimal and near-
optimal persuasion in each. Our first model assumes that action payoffs are drawn i.i.d. from an explicitly
described marginal distribution. Our second model considers independent yet non-identical actions, again
with explicitly-described marginals. Our third and most general model considers an arbitrary joint distribu-
tion of action payoffs presented by a black-box sampling oracle. In proving our results, we draw connections
to techniques and concepts developed in the context of Bayesian mechanism design (BMD), exercising and
generalizing them along the way as needed to prove our results. We mention some of these connections
briefly here, and elaborate on the similarities and differences from the BMD literature in Appendix A.
We start with the i.i.d model, and show two results: a “simple” and polynomial-time e−1
e
-approximate
signaling scheme, and a polynomial-time implementation of the optimal scheme. Both results hinge on a
“symmetry characterization” of the optimal scheme in the i.i.d. setting, closely related to the symmetrization
result from BMD by [20] but with an important difference which we discuss in Appendix A. Our “simple”
scheme decouples the signaling problem for the different actions and signals independently for each. This
result implies that signaling in this setting can be “distributed” among multiple non-coordinating persuaders
without much loss. Our optimal scheme involves a connection to Border’s characterization of the space
of feasible reduced-form auctions [13, 12], as well as its algorithmic properties [15, 1]. This connection
involves proving a correspondence between “symmetric” signaling schemes and a subset of “symmetric”
single-item auctions; one in which actions in persuasion correspond to bidders in an auction.
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Next, we consider Bayesian persuasion with independent non-identical actions. One might expect that
the partial correspondence between signaling schemes and single-item auctions in the i.i.d. model gen-
eralizes here, in which case Border’s theorem — which extends to single-item auctions with independent
non-identical bidders — would analogously lead to polynomial time algorithm for persuasion in this setting.
However, we surprisingly show that this analogy to single-item auctions ceases to hold for non-identical
actions: we prove that there is no generalized Border’s theorem, in the sense of Gopalan et al. [30], for per-
suasion with independent actions. Specifically, we show that it is #P-hard to exactly compute the expected
sender utility for the optimal scheme, ruling out Border’s-theorem-like approaches to this problem unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Our proof starts from the ideas of [30], but our reduction is much more
involved and goes through the membership problem for an implicit polytope which encodes a #P-hard prob-
lem — we elaborate on these differences in Appendix A. We note that whereas we do rule out computing an
explicit representation of the optimal scheme which permits evaluating optimal sender utility, we do not rule
out other approaches which might sample the optimal scheme “on the fly” in the style of Myerson’s optimal
auction [41]— we leave the intriguing question of whether this is possible as an open problem.
Finally, we consider the black-box model with general distributions, and prove essentially-matching pos-
itive and negative results. For our positive result, we exhibit fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
(FPTAS) with a bicriteria guarantee. Specifically, our scheme loses an additive ǫ in both expected sender
utility and incentive-compatibility (as defined in Section 2), and runs in time polynomial in the number of
actions and 1
ǫ
. Our negative results show that this is essentially the best possible for information-theoretic
reasons: any polynomial-time scheme in the black box model which comes close to optimality must signif-
icantly sacrifice incentive compatibility, and vice versa. We note that our scheme is related to some prior
work on BMD with black-box distributions [16, 45], but is significantly simpler and more efficient: instead
of using the ellipsoid method to optimize over “reduced forms”, our scheme simply solves a single linear
program on a sample from the prior distribution on states of nature. Such simplicity is possible in our setting
due to the different notion of incentive compatibility in persuasion, which reduces to incentive compatibility
on the sample using the principle of deferred decisions. We elaborate on this connection in Appendix A.
We remark that our results suggest that the differences between persuasion and auction design serve as
a double-edged sword. This is evidenced by our negative result for independent model and our “simple”
positive result for the black-box model.
1.3 Additional Discussion of Related Work
To our knowledge, Brocas and Carrillo [14] were the first to explicitly consider persuasion through informa-
tion control. They consider a sender with the ability to costlessly acquire information regarding the payoffs
of the receiver’s actions, with the stipulation that acquired information is available to both players. This
is technically equivalent to our (and Kamenica and Gentzkow’s [34]) informed sender who commits to a
signaling scheme. Brocas and Carrillo restrict attention to a particular setting with two states of nature and
three actions, and characterize optimal policies for the sender and their associated payoffs. Kamenica and
Gentzkow’s [34] Bayesian Persuasion model naturally generalizes [14] to finite (or infinite yet compact)
states of nature and action spaces. They establish a number of properties of optimal information structures
in this model; most notably, they characterize settings in which signaling strictly benefits the sender in terms
of the convexity/concavity of the sender’s payoff as a function of the receiver’s posterior belief.
Since [14] and [34], an explosion of interest in persuasion problems followed. The basic Bayesian
persuasion model underlies, or is closely related to, recent work in a number of different domains: price
discrimination by Bergemann et al. [10], advertising by Chakraborty and Harbaugh [17], security games
by Xu et al. [46] and Rabinovich et al. [42], multi-armed bandits by Kremer et al. [37] and Mansour et al.
[38], medical research by Kolotilin [35], and financial regulation by Gick and Pausch [28] and Goldstein
and Leitner [29]. Generalizations and variants of the Bayesian persuasion model have also been considered:
Gentzkow and Kamenica [26] consider multiple senders, Alonso and Caˆmara [2] consider multiple receivers
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in a voting setting, Gentzkow and Kamenica [27] consider costly information acquisition, Rayo and Segal
[43] consider an outside option for the receiver, and Kolotilin et al. [36] considers a receiver with private
side information.
Optimal persuasion is a special case of information structure design in games, also known as signal-
ing. The space of information structures, and their induced equilibria, are characterized by Bergemann and
Morris [8]. Recent work in the CS community has also examined the design of information structures algo-
rithmically. Work by Emek et al. [24], Miltersen and Sheffet [40], Guo and Deligkas [32], and Dughmi et al.
[23], examine optimal signaling in a variety of auction settings, and presents polynomial-time algorithms
and hardness results. Dughmi [22] exhibits hardness results for signaling in two-player zero-sum games, and
Cheng et al. [18] present an algorithmic framework and apply it to a number of different signaling problems.
Also related to the Bayesian persuasion model is the extensive literature on cheap talk starting with
Crawford and Sobel [19]. Cheap talk can be viewed as the analogue of persuasion when the sender cannot
commit to an information revelation policy. Nevertheless, the commitment assumption in persuasion has
been justified on the grounds that it arises organically in repeated cheap talk interactions with a long horizon
— in particular when the sender must balance his short term payoffs with long-term credibility. We refer
the reader to the discussion of this phenomenon in [43]. Also to this point, Kamenica and Gentzkow [34]
mention that an earlier model of repeated 2-player games with asymmetric information by Aumann and
Maschler [5] is mathematically analogous to Bayesian persuasion.
Various recent models on selling information in [6, 7, 11] are quite similar to Bayesian persuasion, with
the main difference being that the sender’s utility function is replaced with revenue. Whereas Babaioff et al.
[6] consider the algorithmic question of selling information when states of nature are explicitly given as
input, the analogous algorithmic questions to ours have not been considered in their model. We speculate
that some of our algorithmic techniques might be applicable to models for selling information when the
prior distribution on states of nature is represented succinctly.
As discussed previously, our results involve exercising and generalizing ideas from prior work in Bayesian
mechanism design. We view drawing these connections as one of the contributions of our paper. In Ap-
pendix A, we discuss these connections and differences at length.
2 Preliminaries
In a persuasion game, there are two players: a sender and a receiver. The receiver is faced with selecting
an action from [n] = {1, . . . , n}, with an a-priori-unknown payoff to each of the sender and receiver. We
assume payoffs are a function of an unknown state of nature θ, drawn from an abstract set Θ of potential
realizations of nature. Specifically, the sender and receiver’s payoffs are functions s, r : Θ × [n] → R,
respectively. We use r = r(θ) ∈ Rn to denote the receiver’s payoff vector as a function of the state
of nature, where ri(θ) is the receiver’s payoff if he takes action i and the state of nature is θ. Similarly
s = s(θ) ∈ Rn denotes the sender’s payoff vector, and si(θ) is the sender’s payoff if the receiver takes
action i and the state is θ. Without loss of generality, we often conflate the abstract set Θ indexing states of
nature with the set of realizable payoff vector pairs (s, r) — i.e., we think of Θ as a subset of Rn ×Rn. We
assume that Θ is finite for notational convenience, though this is not needed for our results in Section 5.
In Bayesian persuasion, it is assumed that the state of nature is a-priori unknown to the receiver, and
drawn from a common-knowledge prior distribution λ supported on Θ. The sender, on the other hand, has
access to the realization of θ, and can commit to a policy of partially revealing information regarding its
realization before the receiver selects his action. Specifically, the sender commits to a signaling scheme ϕ,
mapping (possibly randomly) states of nature Θ to a family of signals Σ. For θ ∈ Θ, we use ϕ(θ) to denote
the (possibly random) signal selected when the state of nature is θ. Moreover, we use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the
probability of selecting the signal σ given a state of nature θ. An algorithm implements a signaling scheme
ϕ if it takes as input a state of nature θ, and samples the random variable ϕ(θ).
Given a signaling scheme ϕ with signals Σ, each signal σ ∈ Σ is realized with probability ασ =
4
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ). Conditioned on the signal σ, the expected payoffs to the receiver of the various actions
are summarized by the vector r(σ) = 1
ασ
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ)r(θ). Similarly, the sender’s payoff as a function
of the receiver’s action are summarized by s(σ) = 1
ασ
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ)s(θ). On receiving a signal σ, the
receiver performs a Bayesian update and selects an action i∗(σ) ∈ argmaxi ri(σ) with expected receiver
utility maxi ri(σ). This induces utility si∗(σ)(σ) for the sender. In the event of ties when selecting i∗(σ),
we assume those ties are broken in favor of the sender.
We adopt the perspective of a sender looking to design ϕ to maximize her expected utility
∑
σ ασsi∗(σ)(σ),
in which case we say ϕ is optimal. When ϕ yields expected sender utility within an additive [multiplicative]
ǫ of the best possible, we say it is ǫ-optimal [ǫ-approximate] in the additive [multiplicative] sense. A simple
revelation-principle style argument [34] shows that an optimal signaling scheme need not use more than n
signals, with one recommending each action. Such a direct scheme ϕ has signals Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}, and
satisfies ri(σi) ≥ rj(σi) for all i, j ∈ [n]. We think of σi as a signal recommending action i, and the require-
ment ri(σi) ≥ maxj rj(σi) as an incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint on our signaling scheme. We can
now write the sender’s optimization problem as the following LP with variables {ϕ(θ, σi) : θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ [n]}.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ
∑n
i=1 λθϕ(θ, σi)si(θ)
subject to ∑ni=1 ϕ(θ, σi) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σi)ri(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σi)rj(θ), for i, j ∈ [n].
ϕ(θ, σi) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ [n].
(1)
For our results in Section 5, we relax our incentive constraints by assuming that the receiver follows the
recommendation so long as it approximately maximizes his utility — for a parameter ǫ > 0, we relax our re-
quirement to ri(σi) ≥ maxj rj(σi)−ǫ, which translates to the relaxed IC constraints
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σi)ri(θ) ≥∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σi)(rj(θ) − ǫ) in LP (1). We call such schemes ǫ-incentive compatible (ǫ-IC). We judge the
suboptimality of an ǫ-IC scheme relative to the best (absolutely) IC scheme; i.e., in a bi-criteria sense.
Finally, we note that expected utilities, incentive compatibility, and optimality are properties not only
of a signaling scheme ϕ, but also of the distribution λ over its inputs. When λ is not clear from context
and ϕ is supported on a superset of λ, we often say that a signaling scheme ϕ is IC [ǫ-IC] for λ, or optimal
[ǫ-optimal] for λ. We also use us(ϕ, λ) to denote the expected sender utility
∑
θ∈Θ
∑n
i=1 λθϕ(θ, σi)si(θ).
3 Persuasion with I.I.D. Actions
In this section, we assume the payoffs of different actions are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
according to an explicitly-described marginal distribution. Specifically, each state of nature θ is a vector in
Θ = [m]n for a parameter m, where θi ∈ [m] is the type of action i. Associated with each type j ∈ [m] is
a pair (ξj , ρj) ∈ R2, where ξj [ρj] is the payoff to the sender [receiver] when the receiver chooses an action
with type j. We are given a marginal distribution over types, described by a vector q = (q1, ..., qm) ∈ ∆m.
We assume each action’s type is drawn independently according to q; specifically, the prior distribution λ
on states of nature is given by λ(θ) =
∏
i∈[n] qθi . For convenience, we let ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξm) ∈ Rm and
ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρm) ∈ R
m denote the type-indexed vectors of sender and receiver payoffs, respectively. We
assume ξ, ρ, and q — the parameters describing an i.i.d. persuasion instance — are given explicitly.
Note that the number of states of nature is mn, and therefore the natural representation of a signaling
scheme has nmn variables. Moreover, the natural linear program for the persuasion problem in Section 2
has an exponential in n number of both variables and constraints. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 2
we seek only to implement an optimal or near-optimal scheme ϕ as an oracle which takes as input θ and
samples a signal σ ∼ ϕ(θ). Our algorithms will run in time polynomial in n and m, and will optimize over
a space of succinct “reduced forms” for signaling schemes which we term signatures, to be described next.
For a state of nature θ, define the matrix Mθ ∈ {0, 1}n×m so that Mθij = 1 if and only if action i has type
j in θ (i.e. θi = j). Given an i.i.d prior λ and a signaling scheme ϕ with signals Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}, for each
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Mσi =
∑
θ λ(θ)ϕ(θ, σi)M
θ, for i = 1, . . . , n.∑n
i=1 ϕ(θ, σi) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
ϕ(θ, σi) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ [n].
Figure 1: Realizable Signatures P
max
∑n
i=1 ξ ·M
σi
i
s.t. ρ ·Mσii ≥ ρ ·M
σi
j , for i, j ∈ [n].
(Mσ1 , ...,Mσn ) ∈ P
Figure 2: Persuasion in Signature Space
i ∈ [n] let αi =
∑
θ λ(θ)ϕ(θ, σi) denote the probability of sending σi, and let Mσi =
∑
θ λ(θ)ϕ(θ, σi)M
θ
.
Note that Mσijk is the joint probability that action j has type k and the scheme outputs σi. Also note that each
row of Mσi sums to αi, and the jth row represents the un-normalized posterior type distribution of action j
given signal σi. We call M = (Mσ1 , ...,Mσn) ∈ Rn×m×n the signature of ϕ. The sender’s objective and
receiver’s IC constraints can both be expressed in terms of the signature. In particular, using Mj to denote
the jth row of a matrix M , the IC constraints are ρ ·Mσii ≥ ρ ·M
σi
j for all i, j ∈ [n], and the sender’s
expected utility assuming the receiver follows the scheme’s recommendations is
∑
i∈[n] ξ ·M
σi
i .
We say M = (Mσ1 , ...,Mσn ) ∈ Rn×m×n is realizable if there exists a signaling scheme ϕ with M as
its signature. Realizable signatures constitutes a polytope P ⊆ Rn×m×n, which has an exponential-sized
extended formulation as shown Figure 1. Given this characterization, the sender’s optimization problem can
be written as a linear program in the space of signatures, shown in Figure 2:
3.1 Symmetry of the Optimal Signaling Scheme
We now show that there always exists a “symmetric” optimal scheme when actions are i.i.d. Given a signa-
tureM = (Mσ1 , ...,Mσn ), it will sometimes be convenient to think of it as the set of pairs {(Mσi , σi)}i∈[n].
Definition 3.1. A signaling scheme ϕ with signature {(Mσi , σi)}i∈[n] is symmetric if there exist x,y ∈ Rm
such that Mσii = x for all i ∈ [n] and Mσij = y for all j 6= i. The pair (x,y) is the s-signature of ϕ.
In other words, a symmetric signaling scheme sends each signal with equal probability ||x||1, and in-
duces only two different posterior type distributions for actions: x||x||1 for the recommended action, and
y
||y||1
for the others. We call (x,y) realizable if there exists a signaling scheme with (x,y) as its s-signature. The
family of realizable s-signatures constitutes a polytope Ps, and has an extended formulation by adding the
variables x,y ∈ Rm and constraints Mσii = x and M
σi
j = y for all i, j ∈ [n] with i 6= j to the extended
formulation of (asymmetric) realizable signatures from Figure 1.
We make two simple observations regarding realizable s-signatures. First, ||x||1 = ||y||1 = 1n for
each (x,y) ∈ Ps, and this is because both ||x||1 and ||y||1 equal the probability of each of the n signals.
Second, since the signature must be consistent with prior marginal distribution q, we have x+ (n− 1)y =∑n
i=1M
σi
1 = q. We show that restricting to symmetric signaling schemes is without loss of generality.
Theorem 3.2. When the action payoffs are i.i.d., there exists an optimal and incentive-compatible signaling
scheme which is symmetric.
Theorem 3.2 is proved in Appendix B.1. At a high level, we show that optimal signaling schemes are
closed with respect to two operations: convex combination and permutation. Specifically, a convex combi-
nation of realizable signatures — viewed as vectors in Rn×m×n — is realized by the corresponding “random
mixture” of signaling schemes, and this operation preserves optimality. The proof of this fact follows easily
from the fact that linear program in Figure 2 has a convex family of optimal solutions. Moreover, given a
permutation π ∈ Sn and an optimal signature M = {(Mσi , σi)}i∈[n] realized by signaling scheme ϕ, the
“permuted” signature π(M) = {(πMσi , σπ(i))}i∈[n] — where premultiplication of a matrix by π denotes
permuting the rows of the matrix — is realized by the “permuted” scheme ϕπ(θ) = π(ϕ(π−1(θ))), which
is also optimal. The proof of this fact follows from the “symmetry” of the (i.i.d.) prior distribution about the
different actions. Theorem 3.2 is then proved constructively as follows: given a realizable optimal signature
M, the “symmetrized” signature M = 1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
π(M) is realizable, optimal, and symmetric.
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3.2 Implementing the Optimal Signaling Scheme
We now exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm for persuasion in the i.i.d. model. Theorem 3.2 permits re-
writing the optimization problem in Figure 2 as follows, with variables x,y ∈ Rm.
maximize nξ · x
subject to ρ · x ≥ ρ · y
(x,y) ∈ Ps
(2)
Problem (2) cannot be solved directly, since Ps is defined by an extended formulation with exponentially
many variables and constraints, as described in Section 3.1. Nevertheless, we make use of a connection
between symmetric signaling schemes and single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders to solve (2) using the
Ellipsoid method. Specifically, we show a one-to-one correspondence between symmetric signatures and (a
subset of) symmetric reduced forms of single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 ([13]). Consider a single-item auction setting with n i.i.d. bidders and m types for each
bidder, where each bidder’s type is distributed according to q ∈ ∆m. An allocation rule is a randomized
function A mapping a type profile θ ∈ [m]n to a winner A(θ) ∈ [n] ∪ {∗}, where ∗ denotes not allocating
the item. We say the allocation rule has symmetric reduced form τ ∈ [0, 1]m if for each bidder i ∈ [n] and
type j ∈ [m], τj is the conditional probability of i receiving the item given she has type j.
When q is clear from context, we say τ is realizable if there exists an allocation rule with τ as its symmetric
reduced form. We say an algorithm implements an allocation rule A if it takes as input θ, and samples A(θ).
Theorem 3.4. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with n i.i.d. actions and m types, with parameters
q ∈ ∆m, ξ ∈ R
m
, and ρ ∈ Rm given explicitly. An optimal and incentive-compatible signaling scheme can
be implemented in poly(m,n) time.
Theorem 3.4 is a consequence of the following set of lemmas.
Lemma 3.5. Let (x,y) ∈ [0, 1]m × [0, 1]m, and define τ = (x1
q1
, ..., xm
qm
). The pair (x,y) is a realizable
s-signature if and only if (a) ||x||1 = 1n , (b) x+ (n− 1)y = q, and (c) τ is a realizable symmetric reduced
form of an allocation rule with n i.i.d. bidders, m types, and type distribution q. Moreover, assuming x and
y satisfy (a), (b) and (c), and given black-box access to an allocation rule A with symmetric reduced form
τ , a signaling scheme with s-signature (x,y) can be implemented in poly(n,m) time.
Lemma 3.6. An optimal realizable s-signature, as described by LP (2), is computable in poly(n,m) time.
Lemma 3.7. (See [15, 1]) Consider a single-item auction setting with n i.i.d. bidders and m types for each
bidder, where each bidder’s type is distributed according to q ∈ ∆m. Given a realizable symmetric reduced
form τ ∈ [0, 1]m, an allocation rule with reduced form τ can be implemented in poly(n,m) time.
The proofs of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 can be found in Appendix B.2. The proof of Lemma 3.5 builds
a correspondence between s-signatures of signaling schemes and certain reduced-form allocation rules.
Specifically, actions correspond to bidders, action types correspond to bidder types, and signaling σi cor-
responds to assigning the item to bidder i. The expression of the reduced form in terms of the s-signature
then follows from Bayes’ rule. Lemma 3.6 follows from Lemma 3.5, the ellipsoid method, and the fact that
symmetric reduced forms admit an efficient separation oracle (see [13, 12, 15, 1]).
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Algorithm 1 Independent Signaling Scheme
Input: Sender payoff vector ξ, receiver payoff vector ρ, prior distribution q
Input: State of nature θ ∈ [m]n
Output: An n-dimensional binary signal σ ∈ {HIGH,LOW}n
1: Compute an optimal solution (x∗,y∗) linear program (3).
2: For each action i independently, set component signal oi to HIGH with probability
x∗
θi
qθi
and to LOW
otherwise, where θi is the type of action i in the input state θ.
3: Return σ = (o1, ..., on).
3.3 A Simple (1− 1
e
)-Approximate Scheme
Our next result is a “simple” signaling scheme which obtains a (1−1/e) multiplicative approximation when
payoffs are nonnegative. This algorithm has the distinctive property that it signals independently for each
action, and therefore implies that approximately optimal persuasion can be parallelized among multiple
colluding senders, each of whom only has access to the type of one or more of the actions.
Recall from Section 3.1 that an s-signature (x,y) satisfies ||x||1 = ||y||1 = 1n and x+ (n − 1)y = q.
Our simple scheme, shown in Algorithm 1, works with the following explicit linear programming relaxation
of optimization problem (2).
maximize nξ · x
subject to ρ · x ≥ ρ · y
x+ (n − 1)y = q
||x||1 =
1
n
x,y ≥ 0
(3)
Algorithm 1 has a simple and instructive interpretation. It computes the optimal solution (x∗,y∗) to
the relaxed problem (3), and uses this solution as a guide for signaling independently for each action. The
algorithm selects, independently for each action i, a component signal oi ∈ {HIGH,LOW}. In particular,
each oi is chosen so that Pr[oi = HIGH] = 1n , and moreover the events oi = HIGH and oi = LOW
induce the posterior beliefs nx∗ and ny∗, respectively, regarding the type of action i.
The signaling scheme implemented by Algorithm 1 approximately matches the optimal value of (3),
as shown in Theorem 3.8, assuming the receiver is rational and therefore selects an action with a HIGH
component signal if one exists. We note that the scheme of Algorithm 1, while not a direct scheme as
described, can easily be converted into one; specifically, by recommending an action whose component sig-
nal is HIGH when one exists (breaking ties arbitrarily), and recommending an arbitrary action otherwise.
Theorem 3.8 follows from the fact that (x∗,y∗) is an optimal solution to LP (3), the fact that the posterior
type distribution of an action i is nx∗ when oi = HIGH and ny∗ when oi = LOW, and the fact that each
component signal is high independently with probability 1
n
. We defer the formal proof to Appendix B.3.
Theorem 3.8. Algorithm 1 runs in poly(m,n) time, and serves as a (1− 1
e
)-approximate signaling scheme
for the Bayesian Persuasion problem with n i.i.d. actions, m types, and nonnegative payoffs.
Remark 3.9. Algorithm 1 signals independently for each action. This conveys an interesting conceptual
message. That is, even though the optimal signaling scheme might induce posterior beliefs which correlate
different actions, it is nevertheless true that signaling for each action independently yields an approximately
optimal signaling scheme. As a consequence, collaborative persuasion by multiple parties (the senders),
each of whom observes the payoff of one or more actions, is a task that can be parallelized, requiring no
coordination when actions are identical and independent and only an approximate solution is sought. We
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leave open the question of whether this is possible when action payoffs are independently but not identically
distributed.
4 Complexity Barriers to Persuasion with Independent Actions
In this section, we consider optimal persuasion with independent action payoffs as in Section 3, albeit
with action-specific marginal distributions given explicitly. Specifically, for each action i we are given
a distribution qi ∈ ∆mi on mi types, and each type j ∈ [mi] of action i is associated with a sender
payoff ξij ∈ R and a receiver payoff ρij ∈ R. The positive results of Section 3 draw a connection between
optimal persuasion in the special case of identically distributed actions and Border’s characterization of
reduced-form single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders. One might expect this connection to generalize to the
independent non-identical persuasion setting, since Border’s theorem extends to single-item auctions with
independent non-identical bidders. Surprisingly, we show that this analogy to Border’s characterization fails
to generalize. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with independent actions, with action-specific
payoff distributions given explicitly. It is #P -hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility.
Invoking the framework of Gopalan et al. [30], this rules out a generalized Border’s theorem for our
setting, in the sense defined by [30], unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to PNP . We view this result
as illustrating some of the important differences between persuasion and mechanism design.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is rather involved. We defer the full proof to Appendix C, and only present a
sketch here. Our proof starts from the ideas of Gopalan et al. [30], who show the #P-hardness for revenue or
welfare maximization in several mechanism design problems. In one case, [30] reduce from the #P -hard
problem of computing the Khintchine constant of a vector. Our reduction also starts from this problem, but
is much more involved:2 First, we exhibit a polytope which we term the Khintchine polytope, and show that
computing the Khintchine constant reduces to linear optimization over the Khintchine polytope. Second,
we present a reduction from the membership problem for the Khintchine polytope to the computation of
optimal sender utility in a particularly-crafted instance of persuasion with independent actions. Invoking the
polynomial-time equivalence between membership checking and optimization (see, e.g., [31]), we conclude
the #P-hardness of our problem. The main technical challenge we overcome is in the second step of our
proof: given a point x which may or may not be in the Khintchine polytope K, we construct a persuasion
instance and a threshold T so that points in K encode signaling schemes, and the optimal sender utility is at
least T if and only if x ∈ K and the scheme corresponding to x results in sender utility T .
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.1
The Khintchine problem, shown to be #P-hard in [30], is to compute the Khintchine constant K(a) of a
given vector a ∈ Rn, defined as K(a) = Eθ∼{±1}n [|θ · a|] where θ is drawn uniformly at random from
{±1}n. To relate the Khintchine problem to Bayesian persuasion, we begin with a persuasion instance with
n i.i.d. actions and two action types, which we refer to as type -1 and type +1. The state of nature is a uniform
random draw from the set {±1}n, with the ith entry specifying the type of action i. We call this instance the
Khintchine-like persuasion setting. As in Section 3, we still use the signature to capture the payoff-relevant
features of a signaling scheme, but we pay special attention to signaling schemes which use only two signals,
in which case we represent them using a two-signal signature of the form (M1,M2) ∈ Rn×2 × Rn×2. The
Khintchine polytope K(n) is then defined as the (convex) family of all realizable two-signal signatures for
the Khintchine-like persuasion problem with an additional constraint: each signal is sent with probability
exactly 12 . We first prove that general linear optimization over K(n) is #P-hard by encoding computation of
2In [30], Myerson’s characterization is used to show that optimal mechanism design in a public project setting directly encodes
computation of the Khintchine constant. No analogous direct connection seems to hold here.
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the Khintchine constant as linear optimization over K(n). In this reduction, the optimal solution in K(n) is
the signature of the two-signal scheme ϕ(θ) = sign(θ · a), which signals + and − each with probability 12 .
To reduce the membership problem for the Khintchine polytope to optimal Bayesian persuasion, the
main challenges come from our restrictions onK(n), namely to schemes with two signals which are equally
probable. Our reduction incorporates three key ideas. The first is to design a persuasion instance in which
the optimal signaling scheme uses only two signals. The instance we define will have n+1 actions. Action 0
is special – it deterministically results in sender utility ǫ > 0 (small enough) and receiver utility 0. The other
n actions are regular. Action i > 0 independently results in sender utility −ai and receiver utility ai with
probability 12 (call this type 1i), or sender utility −bi and receiver utility bi with probability 12 (call this type
2i), for ai and bi to be set later. Note that the sender and receiver utilities are zero-sum for both types. Since
the special action is deterministic and the probability of its (only) type is 1 in any signal, we can interpret
any (M1,M2) ∈ K(n) as a two-signal signature for our persuasion instance (the row corresponding to the
special action 0 is implied). We show that restricting to two-signal schemes is without loss of generality
in this persuasion instance. The proof tracks the following intuition: due to the zero-sum nature of regular
actions, any additional information regarding regular actions would benefit the receiver and harm the sender.
Consequently, sender does not reveal any information which distinguishes between different regular actions.
Formally, we prove that there always exists an optimal signaling scheme with only two signals: one signal
recommends the special action, and the other recommends some regular action.
We denote the signal that recommends the special action 0 by σ+ (indicating that the sender derives
positive utility ǫ), and denote the other signal by σ− (indicating that the sender derives negative utility, as
we show). The second key idea concerns choosing appropriate values for {ai}ni=1, {bi}ni=1 for a given two-
signature (M1,M2) to be tested. We choose these values to satisfy the following two properties: (1) For
all regular actions, the signaling scheme implementing (M1,M2) (if it exists) results in the same sender
utility −1 (thus receiver utility 1) conditioned on σ− and the same sender utility 0 conditioned on σ+; (2)
the maximum possible expected sender utility from σ−, i.e., the sender utility conditioned on σ− multiplied
by the probability of σ−, is −12 . As a result of Property (1), if (M1,M2) ∈ K(n) then the corresponding
signaling scheme ϕ is IC and results in expected sender utility T = 12ǫ −
1
2 (since each signal is sent with
probability 12 ). Property (2) implies that ϕ results in the maximum possible expected sender utility from σ−.
We now run into a challenge: the existence of a signaling scheme with expected sender utility T = 12ǫ−
1
2
does not necessarily imply that (M1,M2) ∈ K(n) if ǫ is large. Our third key idea is to set ǫ > 0 “sufficiently
small” so that any optimal signaling scheme must result in the maximum possible expected sender utility−12
from signal σ− (see Property (2) above). In other words, we must make ǫ so small so that the sender prefers
to not sacrifice any of her payoff from σ− in order to gain utility from the special action recommended by
σ+. We show that such an ǫ exists with polynomially many bits. We prove its existence by arguing that
the polytope of incentive-compatible two-signal signatures has polynomial bit complexity, and therefore an
ǫ > 0 that is smaller than the “bit complexity” of the vertices would suffice.
As a result of this choice of ǫ, if the optimal sender utility is precisely T = 12ǫ −
1
2 then we know that
signal σ+ must be sent with probability 12 since the expected sender utility from signal σ− must be −
1
2 .
We show that this, together with the specifically constructed {ai}ni=1, {bi}ni=1, is sufficient to guarantee that
the optimal signaling scheme must implement the given two-signature (M1,M2), i.e., (M1,M2) ∈ K(n).
When the optimal optimal sender utility is strictly greater than 12ǫ −
1
2 , the optimal signaling scheme does
not implement (M1,M2), but we show that it can be post-processed into one that does.
5 The General Persuasion Problem
We now turn our attention to the Bayesian Persuasion problem when the payoffs of different actions are
arbitrarily correlated, and the joint distribution λ is presented as a black-box sampling oracle. We assume
that payoffs are normalized to lie in the bounded interval, and prove essentially matching positive and
negative results. Our positive result is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for optimal persuasion
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Algorithm 2 Signaling Scheme for a Black Box Distribution
Parameter: ǫ ≥ 0
Parameter: Integer K ≥ 0
Input: Prior distribution λ supported on [−1, 1]2n, given by a sampling oracle
Input: State of nature θ ∈ [−1, 1]2n
Output: Signal σ ∈ Σ, where Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}.
1: Draw integer ℓ uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,K}, and denote θℓ = θ.
2: Sample θ1, . . . , θℓ−1, θℓ+1 . . . , θK independently from λ, and let the multiset λ˜ = {θ1, . . . , θK} denote
the empirical distribution augmented with the input state θ = θℓ.
3: Solve linear program (4) to obtain the signaling scheme ϕ˜ : λ˜→ ∆(Σ).
4: Output a sample from ϕ˜(θ) = ϕ˜(θℓ).
maximize
∑K
k=1
∑n
i=1
1
K
ϕ˜(θk, σi)si(θk)
subject to ∑ni=1 ϕ˜(θk, σi) = 1, for k ∈ [K].∑K
k=1
1
K
ϕ˜(θk, σi)ri(θk) ≥
∑K
k=1
1
K
ϕ˜(θk, σi)(rj(θk)− ǫ), for i, j ∈ [n].
ϕ˜(θk, σi) ≥ 0, for k ∈ [K], i ∈ [n].
(4)
Relaxed Empirical Optimal Signaling Problem
with a bi-criteria guarantee; specifically, we achieve approximate optimality and approximate incentive
compatibility in the additive sense described in Section 2. Our negative results show that such a bi-criteria
loss is inevitable in the black box model for information-theoretic reasons.
5.1 A Bicriteria FPTAS
Theorem 5.1. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem in the black-box oracle model with n actions and
payoffs in [−1, 1], and let ǫ > 0 be a parameter. An ǫ-optimal and ǫ-incentive compatible signaling scheme
can be implemented in poly(n, 1
ǫ
) time.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we show that a simple Monte-Carlo algorithm implements an approximately
optimal and approximately incentive compatible scheme ϕ. Notably, our algorithm does not compute a
representation of the entire signaling scheme ϕ as in Section 3, but rather merely samples its output ϕ(θ)
on a given input θ. At a high level, when given as input a state of nature θ, our algorithm first takes K =
poly(n, 1
ǫ
) samples from the prior distribution λ which, intuitively, serve to place the true state of nature θ
in context. Then the algorithm uses a linear program to compute the optimal ǫ-incentive compatible scheme
ϕ˜ for the empirical distribution of samples augmented with the input θ. Finally, the algorithm signals as
suggested by ϕ˜ for θ. Details are in Algorithm 2, which we instantiate with ǫ > 0 and K = ⌈256n2
ǫ4
log(4n
ǫ
)⌉.
We note that relaxing incentive compatibility is necessary for convergence to the optimal sender utility
— we prove this formally in Section 5.2. This is why LP (4) features relaxed incentive compatibility
constraints. Instantiating Algorithm 2 with ǫ = 0 results in an exactly incentive compatible scheme which
could be far from the optimal sender utility for any finite number of samples K , as reflected in Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 5.1 follows from three lemmas pertaining to the scheme ϕ implemented by Algorithm 2. Ap-
proximate incentive compatibility for λ (Lemma 5.2) follows from the principle of deferred decisions, lin-
earity of expectations, and the fact that ϕ˜ is approximately incentive compatible for the augmented empirical
distribution λ˜. A similar argument, also based on the principal of deferred decisions and linearity of expec-
tations, shows that the expected sender utility from our scheme when θ ∼ λ equals the expected optimal
value of linear program (4), as stated in Lemma 5.3. Finally, we show in Lemma 5.4 that the optimal value
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of LP (4) is close to the optimal sender utility for λ with high probability, and hence also in expectation,
when K = poly(n, 1
ǫ
) is chosen appropriately; the proof of this fact invokes standard tail bounds as well
as structural properties of linear program (4), and exploits the fact that LP (4) relaxes the incentive com-
patibility constraint. We prove all three lemmas in Appendix D.1. Even though our proof of Lemma 5.4 is
self-contained, we note that it can be shown to follow from [45, Theorem 6] with some additional work.
Lemma 5.2. Algorithm 2 implements an ǫ-incentive compatible signaling scheme for prior distribution λ.
Lemma 5.3. Assume θ ∼ λ, and assume the receiver follows the recommendations of Algorithm 2. The
expected sender utility equals the expected optimal value of the linear program (4) solved in Step 3. Both
expectations are taken over the random input θ as well as internal randomness and Monte-Carlo sampling
performed by the algorithm.
Lemma 5.4. Let OPT denote the expected sender utility induced by the optimal incentive compatible
signaling scheme for distribution λ. When Algorithm 2 is instantiated with K ≥ 256n2
ǫ4
log(4n
ǫ
) and its input
θ is drawn from λ, the expected optimal value of the linear program (4) solved in Step 3 is at least OPT − ǫ.
Expectation is over the random input θ as well as the Monte-Carlo sampling performed by the algorithm.
5.2 Information-Theoretic Barriers
We now show that our bi-criteria FPTAS is close to the best we can hope for: there is no bounded-sample
signaling scheme in the black box model which guarantees incentive compatibility and c-optimality for any
constant c < 1, nor is there such an algorithm which guarantees optimality and c-incentive compatibility for
any c < 14 . Formally, we consider algorithms which implement direct signaling schemes. Such an algorithm
takes as input a black-box distribution λ supported on [−1, 1]2n and a state of nature θ ∈ [−1, 1]2n, where n
is the number of actions, and outputs a signal σ ∈ {σ1, . . . , σn} recommending an action. We say such an
algorithm is ǫ-incentive compatible [ǫ-optimal] if for every distribution λ the signaling scheme A(λ) is ǫ-
incentive compatible [ǫ-optimal] for λ. We define the sample complexity SCA(λ, θ) as the expected number
of queries made by A to the blackbox given inputs λ and θ, where expectation is taken the randomness
inherent in the Monte-Carlo sampling from λ as well as any other internal coins of A. We show that the
worst-case sample complexity is not bounded by any function of n and the approximation parameters unless
we allow bi-criteria loss in both optimality and incentive compatibility. More so, we show a stronger negative
result for exactly incentive compatible algorithms: the average sample complexity over θ ∼ λ is also not
bounded by a function of n and the suboptimality parameter. Whereas our results imply that we should
give up on exact incentive compatibility, we leave open the question of whether an optimal and ǫ-incentive
compatible algorithm exists with poly(n, 1
ǫ
) average case (but unbounded worst-case) sample complexity.
Theorem 5.5. The following hold for every algorithm A for Bayesian Persuasion in the black-box model:
(a) If A is incentive compatible and c-optimal for c < 1, then for every integer K there is a distribution
λ = λ(K) on 2 actions and 2 states of nature such that Eθ∼λ[SCA(λ, θ)] > K.
(b) If A is optimal and c-incentive compatible for c < 14 , then for every integer K there is a distribution
λ = λ(K) on 3 actions and 3 states of nature, and θ in the support of λ, such that SCA(λ, θ) > K.
Our proof of each part of this theorem involves constructing a pair of distributions λ and λ′ which are
arbitrarily close in statistical distance, but with the property that any algorithm with the postulated guarantees
must distinguish between λ and λ′. We defer the proof to Appendix D.2.
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A Additional Discussion of Connections to Bayesian Mechanism Design
Section 3, which considers persuasion with independent and identically-distributed actions, relates to two
ideas from auction theory. First, our symmetrization result in Section 3.1 is similar to that of Daskalakis and
Weinberg [20], but involves an additional ingredient which is necessary in our case: not only is the posterior
type distribution for a recommended action (the winning bidder in the auction analogy) independent of the
identity of the action, but so is the posterior type distribution of an unrecommended action (losing bidder).
Second, our algorithm for computing the optimal scheme in Section 3.2 involves a connection to Border’s
characterization of the space of feasible reduced-form single-item auctions [13, 12], as well as its algorithmic
properties [15, 1]. However, unlike in the case of single-item auctions, this connection hinges crucially on
the symmetries of the optimal scheme, and fails to generalize to the case of persuasion with independent
non-identical actions (analogous to independent non-identical bidders) as we show in Section 4. We view
this as evidence that persuasion and auction design — while bearing similarities and technical connections
— are importantly different.
Section 4 shows that our Border’s theorem-based approach in Section 3 can not be extended to in-
dependent non-identical actions. Our starting point are the results of Gopalan et al. [30], who rule out
Border’s-theorem like characterizations for a number of mechanism design settings by showing the #P-
hardness of computing the maximum expected revenue or welfare. Our results similarly show that it is #P
hard to compute the maximum expected sender utility, but our reduction is much more involved. Specifi-
cally, whereas we also reduce from the #P-hard problem of computing the Khintchine constant of a vector,
unlike in [30] our reduction must go through the membership problem of a polytope which we use to en-
code the Khintchine constant computation. This detour seems unavoidable due to the different nature of
the incentive-compatibility constraints placed on a signaling scheme.3 Specifically, we present an intricate
reduction from membership testing in this “Khintchine polytope” to an optimal persuasion problem with
independent actions.
Our algorithmic result for the black box model in Section 5 draws inspiration from, and is technically
related to, the work in [15, 1, 16, 45] on algorithmically efficient mechanisms for multi-dimensional settings.
Specifically, an alternative algorithm for our problem can be derived using the framework of reduced forms
and virtual welfare of Cai et al. [16] with significant additional work.4 For this, a different reduced form
is needed which allows for an unbounded “type space”, and maintains the correlation information across
actions necessary for evaluating the persuasion notion of incentive compatibility, which is importantly dif-
ferent from incentive compatibility in mechanism design. Such a reduced form exists, and the resulting
algorithm is complex and invokes the ellipsoid algorithm as a subroutine. The algorithm we present here is
much simpler and more efficient both in terms of runtime and samples from the distribution λ over states
of nature, with the main computational step being a single explicit linear program which solves for the op-
timal signaling scheme on a sample λ˜ from λ. The analysis of our algorithm is also more straightforward.
This is possible in our setting due to our different notion of incentive compatibility, which permits reduc-
ing incentive compatibility on λ to incentive compatibility on the sample λ˜ using the principle of deferred
decisions.
3In [30], Myerson’s characterization is used to show that optimal mechanism design in a public project setting directly encodes
computation of the Khintchine constant. No analogous direct connection seems to hold here.
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
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B Omissions from Section 3
B.1 Symmetry of the Optimal Scheme (Theorem 3.2)
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need two closure properties of optimal signaling schemes — with respect to
permutations and convex combinations. We use π to denote a permutation of [n], and let Sn denote the set of
all such permutations. We define the permutation π(θ) of a state of nature θ ∈ [m]n so that (π(θ))j = θπ(j),
and similarly the permutation of a signal σi so that π(σi) = σπ(i). Given a signature M = {(Mσi , σi)}i∈[n],
we define the permuted signature π(M) = {(πMσi , π(σi))}i∈[n], where πM denotes applying permutation
π to the rows of a matrix M .
Lemma B.1. Assume the action payoffs are i.i.d., and let π ∈ Sn be an arbitrary permutation. If M is
the signature of a signaling scheme ϕ, then π(M) is the signature of the scheme ϕπ defined by ϕπ(θ) =
π(ϕ(π−1(θ))). Moreover, if ϕ is incentive compatible and optimal, then so is ϕπ.
Proof. Let M = {(Mσ , σ)}σ∈Σ be the signature of ϕ, as given in the statement of the lemma. We first
show that π(M) = {(πMσ , π(σ))}σ∈Σ is realizable as the signature of the scheme ϕπ. By definition, it
suffices to show that
∑
θ λ(θ)ϕπ(θ, π(σ))M
θ = πMσ for an arbitrary signal π(σ).∑
θ
λ(θ)ϕπ(θ, π(σ))M
θ =
∑
θ
λ(θ)ϕ(π−1(θ), σ)Mθ (by definition of ϕπ)
= π
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)ϕ(π−1(θ), σ)(π−1Mθ) (by linearity of permutation)
= π
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)ϕ(π−1(θ), σ)Mπ
−1(θ)
= π
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(π−1(θ))ϕ(π−1(θ), σ)Mπ
−1(θ) (Since λ is i.i.d.)
= π
∑
θ′∈Θ
λ(θ′)ϕ(θ′, σ)Mθ
′ (by renaming π−1(θ) to θ′)
= πMσ (by definition of Mσ)
Now, assuming ϕ is incentive compatible, we check that ϕπ is incentive compatible by verifying the
relevant inequality for its signature.
ρ · (πMσi)π(i) − ρ · (πM
σi)π(j) = ρ ·M
σi
i − ρ ·M
σi
j ≥ 0
Moreover, we show that the sender’s utility is the same for ϕ and ϕπ, completing the proof.
ξ · (πMσi)π(i) = ξ · (M
σi)i
Lemma B.2. Let t ∈ [0, 1]. IfA = (Aσ1 , . . . , Aσn) is the signature of scheme ϕA, and B = (Bσ1 , . . . , Bσn)
is the signature of a scheme ϕB , then their convex combination C = (Cσ1 , . . . , Cσn) with Cσi = tAσi +
(1− t)Bσi is the signature of the scheme ϕC which, on input θ, outputs ϕA(θ) with probability t and ϕB(θ)
with probability 1− t. Moreover, if ϕA and ϕB are both optimal and incentive compatible, then so is ϕC .
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the fact that the optimization problem in Figure 2 is a linear
program, with a convex feasible set and a convex family of optimal solutions. We omit the straightforward
details.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2
Given an optimal and incentive compatible signaling scheme ϕ with signature {(Mσi , σi)}i∈[n], we show the
existence of a symmetric optimal and incentive-compatible scheme of the form in Definition 3.1. According
to Lemma B.1, for π ∈ Sn the signature {(πMσi , π(σi))}i∈[n] — equivalently written as {(πM
σ
pi−1(i) , σi}i∈[n]
— corresponds to the optimal incentive compatible scheme ϕπ. Invoking Lemma B.2, the signature
{(Aσi , σi)}i∈[n] = {(
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
πM
σ
pi−1(i) , σi)}i∈[n]
also corresponds to an optimal and incentive compatible scheme, namely the scheme which draws a permu-
tation π uniformly at random, then signals according to ϕπ.
Observe that the ith row of the matrix πMσpi−1(i) is the π−1(i)th row of the matrix Mσpi−1(i) . Expressing
Aσii as a sum over permutations π ∈ Sn, and grouping the sum by k = π−1(i), we can write
Aσii =
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
[πMσpi−1(i) ]i
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
M
σ
pi−1(i)
π−1(i)
=
1
n!
n∑
k=1
Mσkk ·
∣∣{π ∈ Sn : π−1(i) = k}∣∣
=
1
n!
n∑
k=1
Mσkk · (n− 1)!
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
Mσkk ,
which does not depend on i. Similarly, the jth row of the matrix πMσpi−1(i) is the π−1(j)th row of the
matrix Mσpi−1(i) . For j 6= i, expressing Aσij as a sum over permutations π ∈ Sn, and grouping the sum by
k = π−1(i) and l = π−1(j), we can write
Aσij =
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
[πM
σ
pi−1(i) ]j
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
M
σ
pi−1(i)
π−1(j)
=
1
n!
∑
k 6=l
Mσkl ·
∣∣{π ∈ Sn : π−1(i) = k, π−1(j) = l}∣∣
=
1
n!
∑
k 6=l
Mσkl · (n− 2)!
=
1
n(n− 1)
∑
k 6=l
Mσkl ,
which does not depend on i or j. Let
x =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Mσkk ;
y =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
k 6=l
Mσkl .
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The signature {(Aσi , σi)}i∈[n] therefore describes an optimal, incentive compatible, and symmetric scheme
with s-signature (x,y).
B.2 The Optimal Scheme
Proof of Lemma 3.5
For the “only if” direction, ||x||1 = 1n and x+ (n− 1)y = q were established in Section 3.1. To show that
τ is a realizable symmetric reduced form for an allocation rule, let ϕ be a signaling scheme with s-signature
(x,y). Recall from the definition of an s-signature that, for each i ∈ [n], signal σi has probability 1/n,
and nx is the posterior distribution of action i’s type conditioned on signal σi. Now consider the following
allocation rule: Given a type profile θ ∈ [m]n of the n bidders, allocate the item to bidder i with probability
ϕ(θ, σi) for any i ∈ [n]. By Bayes rule,
Pr[i gets item|i has type j] = Pr[i has type j|i gets item] · Pr[i gets item]
Pr[i has type j]
= nxj ·
1/n
qj
=
xj
qj
Therefore τ is indeed the reduced form of the described allocation rule.
For the “if” direction, let τ , x, and y be as in the statement of the lemma, and consider an allocation
rule A with symmetric reduced form τ . Observe that A always allocates the item, since for each player
i ∈ [n] we have Pr[i gets the item] =
∑m
j=1 qjτj =
∑m
j=1 xj =
1
n
. We define the direct signaling scheme
ϕA by ϕA(θ) = σA(θ). Let M = (Mσ1 , . . . ,Mσn) be the signature of ϕA. Recall that, for θ ∼ λ and
arbitrary i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], Mσiij is the probability that ϕA(θ) = σi and θi = j; by definition, this equals
the probability that A allocates the item to player i and her type is j, which is τjqj = xj . As a result, the
signature M of ϕA satisfies Mσii = x for every action i. If ϕA were symmetric, we would conclude that
its s-signature is (x,y) since every s-signature (x,y′) must satisfy x + (n − 1)y′ = q (see Section 3.1).
However, this is not guaranteed when the allocation rule A exhibits some asymmetry. Nevertheless, ϕA can
be “symmetrized” into a signaling scheme ϕ′A which first draws a random permutation π ∈ Sn, and signals
π(ϕA(π
−1(θ))). That ϕ′A has s-signature (x,y) follows a similar argument to that used in the proof of
Theorem 3.2, and we therefore omit the details here.
Finally, observe that the description of ϕ′A above is constructive assuming black-box access to A, with
runtime overhead that is polynomial in n and m.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
By Lemma 3.5, we can re-write LP (2) as follows:
maximize nξ · x
subject to ρ · x ≥ ρ · y
x+ (n− 1)y = q
||x||1 =
1
n
(x1
q1
, ...., xm
qm
) is a realizable symmetric reduced form
(5)
From [13, 12, 15, 1], we know that the family of all the realizable symmetric reduced forms constitutes
a polytope, and moreover that this polytope admits an efficient separation oracle. The runtime of this oracle
is polynomial in m and n, and as a result the above linear program can be solved in poly(n,m) time using
the Ellipsoid method.
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B.3 A Simple (1− 1/e)-approximate Scheme
Proof of Theorem 3.8
Given a binary signal σ = (o1, . . . , on) ∈ {HIGH,LOW}n, the posterior type distribution for an action
equals nx∗ if the corresponding component signal is HIGH, and equals ny∗ if the component signal is
LOW. This is simply a consequence of the independence of the action types, the fact that the different
component signals are chosen independently, and Bayes’ rule. The constraint ρ · x∗ ≥ ρ · y∗ implies
that the receiver prefers actions i for which oi = HIGH, any one of which induces an expected utility of
nρ · x∗ for the receiver and nξ · x∗ for the sender. The latter quantity matches the optimal value of LP (3).
The constraint ||x||1 = 1n implies that each component signal is HIGH with probability
1
n
, independently.
Therefore, the probability that at least one component signal is HIGH equals 1− (1− 1
n
)n ≥ 1− 1
e
. Since
payoffs are nonnegative, and since a rational receiver selects a HIGH action when one is available, the
sender’s overall expected utility is at least a 1− 1
e
fraction of the optimal value of LP (3).
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C Proof of Theorem 4.1
This section is devoted to proving Theorem 4.1. Our proof starts from the ideas of Gopalan et al. [30],
who show the #P-hardness for revenue or welfare maximization in several mechanism design problems. In
one case, [30] reduce from the #P -hard problem of computing the Khintchine constant of a vector. Our
reduction also starts from this problem, but is much more involved: First, we exhibit a polytope which we
term Khintchine polytope, and show that computing the Khintchine constant reduces to linear optimization
over the Khintchine polytope. Second, we present a reduction from the membership problem for the Khint-
chine polytope to the computation of optimal sender utility in a particularly-crafted instance of persuasion
with independent actions. Invoking the polynomial-time equivalence between membership checking and
optimization (see, e.g., [31]), we conclude the #P-hardness of our problem. The main technical challenge
we overcome is in the second step of our proof: given a point x which may or may not be in the Khint-
chine polytope K, we construct a persuasion instance and a threshold T so that points in K encode signaling
schemes, and the optimal sender utility is at least T if and only if x ∈ K and the scheme corresponding to x
results in sender utility T .
The Khintchine Polytope
We start by defining the Khintchine problem, which is shown to be #P-hard in [30].
Definition C.1. (Khintchine Problem) Given a vector a ∈ Rn, compute the Khintchine constant K(a) of a,
defined as follows:
K(a) = E
θ∼{±1}n
[|θ · a|],
where θ is drawn uniformly at random from {±1}n.
To relate the Khintchine problem to Bayesian persuasion, we begin with a persuasion instance with n
i.i.d. actions. Moreover, there are only two action types,5 which we refer to as type -1 and type +1. The
state of nature is a uniform random draw from the set {±1}n, with the ith entry specifying the type of
action i. It is easy to see that these actions are i.i.d., with marginal probability 12 for each type. We call this
instance the Khintchine-like persuasion setting. As in Section 3, we still use the signature to capture the
payoff-relevant features of a signaling scheme. A signature for the Khintchine-like persuasion problem is
of the form M = (M1, ...,Mn) where M i ∈ Rn×2 for any i ∈ [n]. We pay special attention to signaling
schemes which use only two signals, in which case we represent them using a two-signal signature of the
form (M1,M2) ∈ Rn×2 × Rn×2. Recall that such a signature is realizable if there is a signaling scheme
which uses only two signals, with the property that M ijt is the joint probability of the ith signal and the event
that action j has type t. We now define the Khintchine polytope, consisting of a convex family of two-signal
signatures.
Definition C.2. The Khintchine polytope is the family K(n) of realizable two-signal signatures (M1,M2)
for the Khintchine-like persuasion setting which satisfy the additional constraints M1i,1+M1i,2 = 12 ∀i ∈ [n].
We sometimes use K to denote the Khintchine polytope K(n) when the dimension n is clear from the
context. Note that the constraints M1i,1 +M1i,2 = 12 , ∀i ∈ [n] state that the first signal should be sent with
probability 12 (hence also the second signal). We now show that optimizing over the Khintchine polytope is
#P -hard by reducing the Kintchine problem to Linear program (6).
Lemma C.3. General linear optimization over the Khintchine polytope K is #P -hard.
5Recall from Section 3 that each type is associated with a pair (ξ, ρ), where ξ [ρ] is the payoff to the sender [receiver] if the
receiver takes an action of that type.
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maximize
∑n
i=1 ai(M
+
i,+1 −M
+
i,−1)−
∑n
i=1 ai(M
−
i,+1 −M
−
i,−1)
subject to (M+,M−) ∈ K(n) (6)
Linear program for computing the Khintchine constant K(a) for a ∈ Rn
Proof. For any given a ∈ Rn, we reduce the computation of K(a) – the Khintchine constant for a – to a
linear optimization problem over the Khintchine polytope K. Since our reduction will use two signals σ+
and σ− which correspond to the sign of θ · a, we will use (M+,M−) to denote the two matrices in the
signature in lieu of (M1, M2). Moreover, we use the two action types +1 and −1 to index the columns of
each matrix. For example, M+i,−1 is the joint probability of signal σ+ and the event that the ith action has
type −1.
We claim that the Kintchine constant K(a) equals the optimal objective value of the implicitly-described
linear program (6). We denote this optimal objective value by OPT (LP (6)). We first prove that K(a) ≤
OPT (LP (6)). Consider a signaling scheme ϕ in the Kintchine-like persuasion setting which simply out-
puts σsign(θ·a) for each state of nature θ ∈ {±1}n (breaking tie uniformly at random if θ · a = 0). Since θ is
drawn uniformly from {±1}n and sign(θ · a) = −sign(−θ · a), this scheme outputs each of the signals σ−
and σ+ with probability 12 . Consequently, the two-signal signature of ϕ is a point inK. Moreover, evaluating
the objective function of LP (6) on the two-signal signature (M+,M−) of ϕ yields K(a) = Eθ[|θ · a|], as
shown below.
E
θ
[|θ · a|] = E
θ
[θ · a|σ+] ·Pr(σ+) +E
θ
[−θ · a|σ−] ·Pr(σ−)
=
n∑
i=1
aiE
θ
[θi|σ+] ·Pr(σ+)−
n∑
i=1
aiE
θ
[θi|σ−]×Pr(σ−)
=
n∑
i=1
(
ai[Pr(θi = 1|σ+)−Pr(θi = −1|σ+)] ·Pr(σ+)
)
−
n∑
i=1
(
ai[Pr(θi = 1|σ−)−Pr(θi = −1|σ−)] ·Pr(σ−)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
ai[Pr(θi = 1, σ+)−Pr(θi = −1, σ+)]
)
−
n∑
i=1
(
ai[Pr(θi = 1, σ−)−Pr(θi = −1, σ−)]
)
=
n∑
i=1
ai[M
+
i,+1 −M
+
i,−1]−
n∑
i=1
ai[M
−
i,+1 −M
−
i,−1]
This concludes the proof that K(a) ≤ OPT (LP (6)).
Now we prove K(a) ≥ OPT (LP (6)). Take any signaling scheme which uses only two signals σ+ and
σ−, and let (M+,M−) be its two-signal signature. Notice, however, that σ+ now is only the “name” of the
signal, and does not imply that θ · a is positive. Nevertheless, it is still valid to reverse the above derivation
until we reach
n∑
i=1
ai[M
+
i,+1 −M
+
i,−1]−
n∑
i=1
ai[M
−
i,+1 −M
−
i,−1] = E
θ
[θ · a|σ+] ·Pr(σ+) +E
θ
[−θ · a|σ−] ·Pr(σ−).
Since θ · a and −θ · a are each no greater than |θ · a|, we have
E
θ
[θ · a|σ+] ·Pr(σ+) +E
θ
[−θ · a|σ−] ·Pr(σ−) ≤ E
θ
[|θ · a| | σ+] ·Pr(σ+) +E
θ
[|θ · a| | σ−] ·Pr(σ−)
= E
θ
[|θ · a|] = K(a).
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That is, the objective value of LP (6) is upper bounded by K(a), as needed.
Before we proceed to present the reduction from the membership problem for K to optimal persuasion,
we point out an interesting corollary of Lemma C.3.
Corollary C.4. Let P be the polytope of realizable signatures for a persuasion problem with n i.i.d. actions
and m types (see Section 3). Linear optimization over P is #P -hard, and this holds even when m = 2.
Proof. Consider the Khintchine-like persuasion setting. It is easy to see that the Khintchine polytope K can
be obtained from P by adding the constraints Mσi = 0 for i ≥ 3 and Mσ1i,1 +M
σ1
i,2 =
1
2 for i ∈ [n], followed
by a simple projection. Therefore, the membership problem for K can be reduced in polynomial time to the
membership problem for P, since the additional linear constraints can be explicitly checked in polynomial
time. By the polynomial-time equivalence between optimization and membership, it follows that general
linear optimization over P is #P -hard.
Remark C.5. It is interesting to compare Corollary C.4 to single item auctions with i.i.d. bidders, where
the problem does admit a polynomial-time separation oracle for the polytope of realizable signatures via
Border’s Theorem [13, 12] and its algorithmic properties [15, 1]. In contrast, the polytope of realizable sig-
natures for Bayesian persuasion is #P-hard to optimize over. Nevertheless, in Section 3 we were indeed able
to compute the optimal signaling scheme and sender utility for persuasion with i.i.d. actions. Corollary C.4
conveys that it was crucial for our algorithm to exploit the special structure of the persuasion objective and
the symmetry of the optimal scheme, since optimizing a general objective over P is #P-hard.
Reduction
We now present a reduction from the membership problem for the Khintchine polytope to the computation of
optimal sender utility for persuasion with independent actions. As the output of our reduction, we construct a
persuasion instance of the following form. There are n+1 actions. Action 0 is special – it deterministically
results in sender utility ǫ and receiver utility 0. Here, we think of ǫ > 0 as being small enough for our
arguments to go through. The other n actions are regular. Action i > 0 independently results in sender
utility −ai and receiver utility ai with probability 12 (call this the type 1i), or sender utility −bi and receiver
utility bi with probability 12 (call this the type 2i). Note that the sender and receiver utilities are zero-sum
for both types. Notice that, though each regular action’s type distribution is uniform over its two types, the
actions here are not identical because the associated payoffs — specified by ai and bi for each action i —
are different for different actions. Since the special action is deterministic and the probability of its (only)
type is 1 in any signal, we can interpret any (M1,M2) ∈ K(n) as a two-signal signature for our persuasion
instance (the row corresponding to the special action 0 is implied). For example, M1i,2 is the joint probability
of the first signal and the event that action i has type 2i. Our goal is to reduce membership checking forK(n)
to computing the optimal expected sender utility for a persuasion instance with carefully chosen parameters
{ai}
n
i=1, {bi}
n
i=1, and ǫ.
In relating optimal persuasion to the Khintchine polytope, there are two main difficulties: (1) K consists
of two-signal signatures, so there should be an optimal scheme to our persuasion instance which uses only
two signals; (2) To be consistent with the definition of K, such an optimal scheme should send each signal
with probability exactly 12 . We will design specific ǫ, ai, bi to accomplish both goals.
For notational convenience, we will again use (M+,M−) to denote a typical element in K instead of
(M1,M2) because, as we will see later, the two constructed signals will induce positive and negative sender
utilities, respectively. Notice that there are only n degrees of freedom in (M+,M−) ∈ K. This is because
M+ +M− is the all-12 matrix in R
n×2
, corresponding to the prior distribution of states of nature (by the
definition of realizable signatures). Moreover, M+i,1 + M−i,2 = 12 for all i ∈ [n] (by the definition of K).
Therefore, we must have
M+i,1 = M
−
i,2 =
1
2
−M+i,2 =
1
2
−M−i,1.
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This implies that we can parametrize signatures (M+,M−) ∈ K by a vector x ∈ [0, 12 ]
n
, where M+i,1 =
M−i,2 = xi and M
+
i,2 = M
−
i,1 =
1
2 − xi for each i ∈ [n]. For any x ∈ [0,
1
2 ]
n
, let M(x) denote the signature
(M+,M−) defined by x as just described.
We can now restate the membership problem for K as follows: given x ∈ [0, 12 ]
n
, determine whether
M(x) ∈ K. When any of the entries of x equals 0 or 12 this problem is trivial,
6 so we assume without
loss of generality that x ∈ (0, 12)
n
. Moreover, when xi = 14 for some i, it is easy to see that a signaling
scheme with signature M(x), if one exists, must choose its signal independently of the type of action i, and
therefore M(x) ∈ K(n) if and only if M(x
−i) ∈ K(n − 1). This allows us to assume without loss of
generality that xi 6= 14 for all i.
Given x ∈ (0, 12 )
n with xi 6= 14 for all i, we construct specific ǫ and ai, bi for all i such that we
can determine whether M(x) ∈ K by simply looking at the optimal sender utility in the corresponding
persuasion instance. We choose parameters ai and bi to satisfy the following two equations.
xiai + (
1
2
− xi)bi = 0. (7)
(
1
2
− xi)ai + xibi =
1
2
. (8)
We note that the above linear system always has a solution when xi 6= 14 , which we assumed previously.
We make two observations about our choice of ai and bi. First, the prior expected receiver utility 12 (ai+ bi)
equals 12 for all actions i (by simply adding Equation (7) and (8)). Second, ai and bi are both non-zero, and
this follows easily from our assumption that xi ∈ (0, 12).
Now we show how to determine whether M(x) ∈ K by only examining the optimal sender utility in
the constructed persuasion instance. We start by showing that restricting to two-signal schemes is without
loss of generality in our instance.
Lemma C.6. There exists an optimal incentive-compatible signaling scheme which uses at most two signals:
one signal recommends the special action, and the other recommends some regular action.
Proof. Recall that an optimal incentive-compatible scheme uses n+1 signals, with signal σi recommending
action i for i = 0, 1, ..., n. Fix such a scheme, and let αi denote the probability of signal σi. Signal σi
induces posterior expected receiver utility rj(σi) and sender utility sj(σi) for each action j. For a regular
action j 6= 0, we have sj(σi) = −rj(σi) for all i due to the zero-sum nature of our construction. Notice
that ri(σi) ≥ 0 for all regular actions i 6= 0, since otherwise the receiver would prefer action 0 over action i.
Consequently, for each signal σi with i 6= 0, the receiver derives non-negative utility and the sender derives
non-positive utility.
We claim that merging signals σ1, σ2, . . . , σn — i.e., modifying the signaling scheme to output the same
signal σ∗ in lieu of each of them — would not decrease the sender’s expected utility. Recall that incentive
compatibility implies that ri(σi) = maxnj=0 rj(σi). Using Jensen’s inequality, we get
n∑
i=1
αiri(σi) ≥
n
max
j=0
[
n∑
i=1
αirj(σi)
]
. (9)
If the maximum in the right hand side expression of (9) is attained at j∗ = 0, the receiver will choose
the special action 0 when presented with the merged signal σ∗. Recalling that si(σi) is non-positive for
i 6= 0, this can only improve the sender’s expected utility. Otherwise, the receiver chooses a regular action
j∗ 6= 0 when presented with σ∗, resulting in a total contribution of
∑n
i=1 αirj∗(σi) to the receiver’s expected
6If xi is 0 or 12 , thenM(x) ∈ K if and only if xj =
1
4
for all j 6= i. This is because the corresponding signaling scheme must
choose its signal based solely on the type of action i.
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utility from the merged signal, down from the total contribution of
∑n
i=1 αiri(σi) by the original signals
σ1, . . . , σn. Recalling the zero-sum nature of our construction for regular actions, the merged signal σ∗ con-
tributes
∑n
i=1 αisj∗(σi) = −
∑n
i=1 αirj∗(σi) to the sender’s expected utility, up from a total contribution
of
∑n
i=1 αisi(σi) = −
∑n
i=1 αiri(σi) by the original signals σ1, . . . , σn. Therefore, the sender is not worse
off by merging the signals. Moreover, interpreting σ∗ as a recommendation for action j∗ yields incentive
compatibility.
Therefore, in characterizing the optimal solution to our constructed persuasion instance, it suffices to
analyze two-signal schemes of the the form guaranteed by Lemma C.6. For such a scheme, we denote
the signal that recommends the special action 0 by σ+ (indicating that the sender derives positive utility
ǫ), and denote the other signal by σ− (indicating that the sender derives negative utility, as we will show).
For convenience, in the following discussion we use the expression “payoff from a signal” to signify the
expected payoff of a player conditioned on that signal multiplied by the probability of that signal. For
example, the sender’s expected payoff from signal σ− equals the sender’s expected payoff conditioned on
signal σ− multiplied by the overall probability that the scheme outputs σ−, assuming the receiver follows
the scheme’s (incentive compatible) recommendations. We also use the expression “payoff from an action
in a signal” to signify the posterior expected payoff of a player for that action conditioned on the signal,
multiplied by the probability that the scheme outputs the signal. For example, the receiver’s expected payoff
from action i in signal σ+ equals α+ · ri(σ+), where ri(σ+) is the receiver’s posterior expected payoff from
action i given signal σ+, and α+ is the overall probability of signal σ+.
Lemma C.7. Fix an incentive-compatible scheme with signals σ− and σ+ as described above. The sender’s
expected payoff from signal σ− is at most −12 . Moreover, if the sender’ expected payoff from σ− is exactly
−12 , then for each regular action i the expected payoff of both the sender and the receiver from action i in
signal σ+ equals 0.
Proof. Assume that signal σ+ [σ−] is sent with probability α+ [α−] and induces posterior expected receiver
payoff ri(σ+) [ri(σ−)] for each action i. Recall from our construction that the prior expected payoff of each
regular action i 6= 0 equals 12ai +
1
2bi =
1
2 . Since the prior expectation must equal the expected posterior
expectation, it follows that α+ · ri(σ+)+α− · ri(σ−) = 12 when i is regular. The receiver’s reward from the
special action is deterministically 0, and therefore incentive compatibility implies that ri(σ+) ≤ 0 for each
regular action i. It follows that α− · ri(σ−) = 12 − α+ · ri(σ+) ≥
1
2 for regular actions i. In other words,
the receiver’s expected payoff from each regular action in signal σ− is at least 12 . By the zero-sum nature of
our construction, the sender’s expected payoff from each regular action in signal σ− is at most −12 . Since
σ− recommends a regular action, we conclude that the sender’s expected payoff from σ− is at most −12 .
Now assume that the sender’s expected payoff from σ− is exactly −12 . By the zero-sum property,
incentive compatibility, and the above-established fact that α− · ri(σ−) ≥ 12 for regular actions i, it follows
that the receiver’s expected payoff from each regular action in signal σ− is exactly 12 . Recalling that α+ ·
ri(σ+) + α− · ri(σ−) =
1
2 when i is regular, we conclude that the receiver’s expected payoff from a regular
action in signal σ+ equals 0. By the zero-sum property for regular actions, the same is true for the sender.
The key to the remainder of our reduction is to choose a small enough value for the parameter ǫ —
the sender’s utility from the special action — so that the optimal signaling scheme satisfies the property
mentioned in Lemma C.7: The sender’s expected payoff from signal σ− is exactly equal to its maximum
possible value of −12 . In other words, we must make ǫ so small so that the sender prefers to not sacrifice
any of her payoff from σ− in order to gain utility from the special action recommended by σ+. Notice
that this upper bound of −12 is indeed achievable: the uninformative signaling scheme which recommends
an arbitrary regular action has this property. We now show that a “small enough” ǫ indeed exists. The
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key idea behind this existence proof is the following: We start with a signaling scheme which maximizes
the sender’s payoff from σ− at −12 , and moreover corresponds to a vertex of the polytope of incentive-
compatible signatures. When ǫ > 0 is smaller than the “bit complexity” of the vertices of this polytope,
moving to a different vertex — one with lower sender payoff from σ− — will result in more utility loss
from σ− than utility gain from σ+. We show that ǫ > 0 with polynomially many bits suffices, and can be
computed in polynomial time.
Let P2 be the family of all realizable two-signal signatures (again, ignoring action 0). It is easy to see
that P2 is a polytope, and importantly, all entries of any vertex of P2 are integer multiples of 12n . This is
because every vertex of P2 corresponds to a deterministic signaling scheme which partitions the set of states
of nature, and every state of nature occurs with probability 1/2n. As a result, all vertices of P2 have O(n)
bit complexity.
To ease our discussion, we use a compact representation for points in P2. In particular, any point
in P2 can be captured by n + 1 variables: variable p denotes the probability of sending signal σ+, and
variable yi denotes the joint probability of signal σ+ and the event that action i has type 1i. It follows
that joint probability of type 2i and signal σ+ is p − yi, and the probabilities associated with signal σ−
are determined by the constraint that M+ +M− is the all-12 matrix. With some abuse of notation, we use
M(p,y) = (M+,M−) to denote the signature in P2 corresponding to the probability p and n-dimensional
vector y. Now we consider the following two linear programs.
maximize pǫ+ u
subject to M(p,y) ∈ P2
yiai + (p− yi)bi ≤ 0, for i = 1, . . . , n.
u ≤ −[(12 − yi)ai + (
1
2 − p+ yi)bi], for i = 1, . . . , n.
(10)
maximize u
subject to M(p,y) ∈ P2
yiai + (p− yi)bi ≤ 0, for i = 1, . . . , n.
u ≤ −[(12 − yi)ai + (
1
2 − p+ yi)bi], for i = 1, . . . , n.
(11)
Linear programs (10) and (11) are identical except for the fact that the objective of LP (10) includes the
additional term pǫ. LP (10) computes precisely the optimal expected sender utility in our constructed persua-
sion instance: The first set of inequality constraints are the incentive-compatibility constraints for the signal
σ+ recommending action 0; The second set of inequality constraints state that the sender’s payoff from
signal σ− is the minimum among all actions, as implied by the zero-sum nature of our construction; The
objective is the sum of the sender’s payoffs from signals σ+ and σ−. Notice that the incentive-compatibility
constraints for signal σ−, namely (12−yi)ai+(
1
2−p+yi)bi ≥ 0 for all i 6= 0, are implicitly satisfied because
1
2ai+
1
2bi =
1
2 by our construction and (
1
2−yi)ai+(
1
2−p+yi)bi =
1
2ai+
1
2bi−[yiai+(p−yi)bi] ≥
1
2−0 > 0.
On the other hand, LP (11) maximizes the sender’s expected payoff from signal σ−. Observe that the opti-
mal objective value of LP (11) is precisely −12 because u ≤ −[(12 − yi)ai + (12 − p + yi)bi] ≤ −12 for all
i 6= 0, and equality is attained, for example, at p = 0 and y = 0.
Let P˜2 be the set of all feasible (u,M(p,y)) for LP (10) (and LP (11)). Obviously, P˜2 is a polytope. We
now argue that all vertices of P˜2 have bit complexity polynomial in n and the bit complexity of x ∈ (0, 12)
n
.
In particular, denote the bit complexity of x by ℓ. Since ai, bi are computed by a two-variable two-equation
linear system involving xi (Equations (7) and (8)), they each have O(ℓ) bit complexity. Consequently, all
the explicitly described facets of P˜2 have O(ℓ) bit complexity. Moreover, since each vertex of P2 has O(n)
bit complexity, each facet of P2 then has O(n3) bit complexity, i.e., the coefficients of inequalities that
determine the facets have O(n3) bit complexity. This is due to the fact that facet complexity of a rational
polytope is upper bounded by a cubic polynomial of the vertex complexity and vice versa (see, e.g., [44]).
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To sum up, any facet of polytope P˜2 has bit complexity O(n3 + ℓ), and therefore any vertex of P˜2 has
O(n9ℓ3) bit complexity.
Let the polynomial B(n, ℓ) = O(n9ℓ3) be an upper bound on the maximum bit complexity of vertices
of P˜2. Now we are ready to set the value of ǫ. LP (10) always has an optimal vertex solution which we
denote as (u∗,M∗). Recall that u ≤ −12 for all points (u,M(p,y)) in P˜2 and u = −
1
2 is attainable at some
vertices. Since all vertices of P˜2 have B(n, ℓ) bit complexity, (u∗,M∗) must either satisfy either u∗ = −12
or u∗ ≤ −12 − 2
−B(n,ℓ)
. Therefore, it suffices to set ǫ = 2−n·B(n,ℓ), which is a number with polynomial bit
complexity. As a result, any optimal vertex solution to LP (10) must satisfy u∗ = −12 , since the loss incurred
by moving to any other vertex with u < −12 can never be compensated for by the other term pǫ < ǫ.
With such a small value of ǫ, the sender’s goal is to send signal σ+ with probability as high as possible,
subject to the constraint that her utility from σ− is precisely −12 . In other words, signal σ+ must induce
expected receiver/sender utility precisely 0 for each regular action i 6= 0 (see Lemma C.7). This character-
ization of the optimal scheme now allows us to determine whether M(x) ∈ K by inspecting the sender’s
optimal expected utility. The following Lemma completes our proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma C.8. Given the small enough value of ǫ described above, the sender’s expected utility in the optimal
signaling scheme for our constructed persuasion instance is at least 12(ǫ− 1) if and only if M(x) ∈ K.
Proof. ⇐: If M(x) ∈ K, then by our choice of ai, bi (recall Equations (7) and (8)), the signaling scheme
implementing M(x) is incentive compatible, the sender’s payoff from signal σ+ is 12ǫ, and her payoff from
σ− is −12 . Therefore, the optimal sender utility is at least
1
2ǫ−
1
2 .
⇒: Let M(p,y) be the signature of a vertex optimal signaling scheme in LP (10). By our choice of ǫ
we know that the sender payoff from signal σ− must be exactly −12 . Therefore, to achieve overall sender
utility at least 12ǫ −
1
2 , signal σ+ must be sent with probability p ≥
1
2 , and the receiver’s payoff from each
regular action i 6= 0 in signal σ+ is exactly 0. That is, yiai + (p− yi)bi = 0. By construction, we also have
that xiai + (0.5 − xi)bi = 0 and ai, bi 6= 0, which imply that yixi =
p−yi
0.5−xi
and, furthermore, that yi ≥ xi
since p ≥ 12 . Now let ϕ be a signaling scheme with the signature M(p,y). We can post-process ϕ so it
has signature M(x) as follows: whenever ϕ outputs the signal σ+, flip a biased random coin to output σ+
with probability 0.5
p
and output σ− otherwise. By using the identity yixi =
p−yi
0.5−xi
, it is easy to see that this
adjusted signaling scheme has signature M(x).
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D Omitted Proofs from Section 5
D.1 A Bicriteria FPTAS
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Fix ǫ, K , and λ, and let ϕ denote the resulting signaling scheme implemented by Algorithm 2. Let θ ∼ λ
denote the input to ϕ, and σ ∼ ϕ(θ) denote its output. First, we condition on the empirical sample λ˜ =
{θ1, . . . , θK} without conditioning on the index ℓ of the input state of nature θ, and show that ǫ-incentive
compatibility holds subject to this conditioning. The principle of deferred decisions implies that, subject to
this conditioning, θ is uniformly distributed in λ˜. By definition of linear program (4), the signaling scheme
ϕ˜ computed in Step 3 is ǫ-incentive compatible scheme for the empirical distribution λ˜. Since σ ∼ ϕ˜(θ)
and θ is conditionally distributed according to λ˜, this implies that all ǫ-incentive compatibility constraints
conditionally hold; formally, the following holds for each pair of actions i and j:
E[ri(θ)|σ = σi, λ˜] ≥ E[rj(θ)|σ = σi, λ˜]− ǫ
Removing the conditioning on λ˜ and invoking linearity of expectations shows that ϕ is ǫ-incentive
compatible for λ, completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.3
As in the proof of Lemma 5.2, we condition on the empirical sample λ˜ = {θ1, . . . , θK} and observe that θ is
uniformly distributed in λ˜ after this conditioning. The conditional expectation of sender utility then equals∑K
k=1
∑n
i=1
1
K
ϕ˜(θk, σi)si(θk), where ϕ˜ is the signaling scheme computed in Step 3 based on λ˜. Since
this is precisely the optimal value of the LP (4) solved in Step 3, removing the conditioning and invoking
linearity of expectations completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.4
Recall that linear program (1) solves for the optimal incentive compatible scheme for λ. It is easy to see
that the linear program (4) solved in step 3 is simply the instantiation of LP (1) for the empirical distri-
bution λ˜ consisting of K samples from λ. To prove the lemma, it would suffice to show that the optimal
incentive-compatible scheme ϕ∗ corresponding to LP (1) remains ǫ-incentive compatible and ǫ-optimal for
the distribution λ˜, with high probability. Unfortunately, this approach fails because polynomially-many
samples from λ are not sufficient to approximately preserve the incentive compatibility constraints cor-
responding to low-probability signals (i.e., signals which are output with probability smaller than inverse
polynomial in n). Nevertheless, we show in Claim D.1 that there exists an approximately optimal solution
ϕ̂ to LP (1) with the property that every signal σi is either large, which we define as being output by ϕ̂ with
probability at least ǫ4n assuming θ ∼ λ, or honest in that only states of nature θ with i ∈ argmaxj rj(θ)
are mapped to it. It is easy to see that sampling preserves incentive-compatibility exactly for honest signals.
As for large signals, we employ tail bounds and the union bound to show that polynomially many samples
suffice to approximately preserve incentive compatibility (Claim D.2).
Claim D.1. There is a signaling scheme ϕ̂ which is incentive compatible for λ, induces sender utility
us(ϕ̂, λ) ≥ OPT −
ǫ
2 on λ, and such that every signal of ϕ̂ is either large or honest.
Proof. Let ϕ∗ be the optimal incentive-compatible scheme for λ — i.e. the optimal solution to LP (1). We
call a signal σ small if it is output by ϕ∗ with probability less than ǫ4n , i.e. if
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ
∗(θ, σ) < ǫ4n , and
otherwise we call it large. Let ϕ̂ be the scheme which is defined as follows: on input θ, it first samples σ ∼
ϕ∗(θ); if σ is large then ϕ̂ simply outputs σ, and otherwise it recommends an action maximizing receiver
utility in state of nature θ —- i.e., outputs σi′ for i′ ∈ argmaxi ri(θ). It is easy to see that every signal of ϕ̂
is either large or honest. Moreover, since ϕ∗ is incentive compatible and ϕ̂ only replaces recommendations
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Rainy Sunny
Walk 1− δ 1
Drive 1 0
Table 1: Receiver’s Payoffs in Rain and Shine Example
of ϕ∗ with “honest” recommendations, it is easy to check that ϕ̂ is incentive compatible for λ. Finally, since
the total probability of small signals in ϕ∗ is at most ǫ4 , and utilities are in [−1, 1], the sender’s expected
utility from ϕ̂ is no worse than ǫ2 smaller than her expected utility from ϕ
∗
.
Claim D.2. Let ϕ̂ be the signaling scheme from Claim D.1. With probability at least 1− ǫ8 over the sample
λ˜, ϕ̂ is ǫ-incentive compatible for λ˜, and moreover us(ϕ̂, λ˜) ≥ us(ϕ̂, λ)− ǫ4 .
Proof. Recall that ϕ̂ is incentive compatible for λ, and every signal is either large or honest. Since λ˜ is a set
of samples from λ, it is easy to see that incentive compatibility constraints pertaining to the honest signals
continue to hold over λ˜. It remains to show that incentive compatibility constraints for large signals, as well
as expected sender utility, are approximately preserved when replacing λ with λ˜.
Recall that incentive-compatibility requires that Eθ[ϕ̂(θ, σi)(ri(θ) − rj(θ))] ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ [n].
Moreover, the sender’s expected utility can be written as Eθ[
∑n
i=1 ϕ̂(θ, σi)si(θ)]. The left hand side of
each incentive compatibility constraint evaluates the expectation of a fixed function of θ with range [−2, 2],
whereas the sender’s expected utility evaluates the expectation of a function of θ with range in [−1, 1].
Standard tail bounds and the union bound, coupled with our careful choice of the number of samples K ,
imply that replacing distribution λ with λ˜ approximately preserves each of these n2 +1 quantities to within
an additive error of ǫ24n with probability at least 1 −
ǫ
8 . This bound on the additive loss translates to ǫ-
incentive compatibility for the large signals, and is less than the permitted decrease of ǫ4 for expected sender
utility.
The above claims, coupled with the fact that sender payoffs are bounded in [−1, 1], imply that the
expected optimal value of linear program (4) is at least OPT − ǫ, as needed.
D.2 Information-Theoretic Barriers
Impossibility of Incentive Compatibility (Proof of Theorem 5.5 (a))
Consider a setting with two states of nature, which we will conveniently refer to as rainy and sunny. The
receiver, who we may think of as a daily commuter, has two actions: walk and drive. The receiver slightly
prefers driving on a rainy day, and strongly prefers walking on a sunny day. We summarize the receiver’s
payoff function, parametrized by δ > 0, in Table 1. The sender, who we will think of as a municipality with
black-box sample access to weather reports drawn from the same distribution as the state of nature, strongly
prefers that the receiver chooses walking regardless of whether it is sunny or rainy: we let swalk = 1 and
sdrive = 0 in both states of nature.
Let λr be the point distribution on the rainy state of nature, and let λs be such that Prλs [rainy] = 11+2δ
and Prλs [sunny] = 2δ1+2δ . It is easy to see that the unique direct incentive-compatible scheme for λr always
recommends driving, and hence results in expected sender utility of 0. In contrast, a simple calculation
shows that always recommending walking is incentive compatible for λs, and results in expected sender
utility 1. If algorithm A is incentive compatible and c-optimal for a constant c < 1, then A(λr) must never
recommend walking whereas A(λs) must recommend walking with constant probability at least (1 − c)
overall (in expectation over the input state of nature θ ∼ λs as well as all other internal randomness).
Consequently, given a black box distribution D ∈ {λr, λs}, evaluating A(D, θ) on a random draw θ ∼ D
yields a tester which distinguishes between λr and λs with constant probability 1− c.
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Pr[θ1] Pr[θ2] Pr[θ3]
λ 1− 2δ 2δ 0
λ′ 1− 2δ δ δ
Table 2: Two Distributions on Three Actions
Since the total variation distance between λr and λs is O(δ), it is well known (and easy to check) that
any black-box algorithm which distinguishes between the two distributions with Ω(1) success probability
must take Ω(1
δ
) samples in expectation when presented with one of these distributions. As a consequence,
the average-case sample complexity ofA on either of λr and λs is Ω(1δ ). Since δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily
small, this completes the proof.
Impossibility of Optimality (Proof of Theorem 5.5 (b))
Consider a setting with three actions {1, 2, 3} and three corresponding states of nature θ1, θ2, θ3. In each
state θi, the receiver derives utility 1 from action i and utility 0 from the other actions. The sender, on the
other hand, derives utility 1 from action 3 and utility 0 from actions 1 and 2. For an arbitrary parameter
δ > 0, we define two distributions λ and λ′ over states of nature with total variation distance δ, illustrated
in Table 2.
Assume algorithm A is optimal and c-incentive compatible for a constant c < 14 . The optimal incentive-
compatible scheme for λ′ results in expected sender utility 3δ by recommending action 3 whenever the state
of nature is θ2 or θ3, and with probability δ1−2δ when the state of nature is θ1. Some calculation reveals
that in order to match this expected sender utility subject to c-incentive compatibility, signaling scheme
ϕ′ = A(λ′) must satisfy ϕ′(θ2, σ3) ≥ µ for µ = 1 − 4c > 0. In other words, ϕ′ must recommend action
3 a constant fraction of the time when given state θ2 as input. In contrast, since c < 12 it is easy to see that
ϕ = A(λ) can never recommend action 3: for any signal, the posterior expected receiver reward for action 3
is 0, whereas one of the other two actions must have posterior expected receiver reward at least 12 . It follows
that given D ∈ {λ, λ′}, a call toA(D, θ2) yields a tester which distinguishes between λ and λ′ with constant
probability µ. Since λ and λ′ have statistical distance δ, we conclude that the worst case sample complexity
of A on either of λ or λ′ is Ω(1
δ
). Since δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, this completes the proof.
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